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Schools are the interface between evolution and culture. They are the 
contexts in which children’s evolved learning and motivational biases 
intersect with the need to learn the vast array of evolutionarily-novel skills 
(e.g., reading) and knowledge (e.g., geometric concepts) needed to function as 
adults in modern societies. The rapid cross-generational accumulation of 
knowledge during the past several millennia has created a gap between 
children’s evolved learning and motivational biases and the types of learning 
needed to master evolutionarily-novel skills and knowledge. I provide a brief 
overview of these evolved learning and motivational biases, and place them in the 
context of children’s learning and motivation to learn in modern-day schools.     
Key words: evolution, development, cognitive development, academic 
learning. 
 
Desarrollo académico infantil: donde la evolución se encuentra 
con la cultura  
 Las escuelas constituyen el punto de encuentro entre la evolución y la 
cultura. Son los contextos donde los aprendizajes y motivaciones infantiles pre-
dispuestos durante la evolución se entrecruzan con la necesidad de aprender una 
gran cantidad de habilidades (e.g., leer) y conocimientos (e.g., conceptos geomé-
tricos) evolutivamente nuevos, precisos para el funcionamiento adulto en las 
sociedades modernas. La rápida acumulación de conocimientos durante los pasa-
dos milenios ha producido un vacío entre estas predisposiciones de aprendizaje 
y motivación infantiles generadas durante la evolución, y los tipos de aprendizaje 
requeridos para dominar las habilidades y conocimientos evolutivamente nuevos. 
Aquí se realiza una breve descripción de estas predisposiciones de aprendizaje y 
motivación evolutivas, y se las sitúa en el contexto de los aprendizajes y la 
motivación para aprender de los niños en las escuelas modernas. 
Palabras clave: evolución, desarrollo, desarrollo cognitivo, aprendizaje 
académico. 
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 Schooling is at the interface between evolved biases in children’s learning 
and the processes through which culturally-important knowledge and skills are 
transmitted across generations. An understanding of this interface is especially 
critical for societies with vast and rapidly accumulating stores of knowledge (e.g., 
in books). These are societies in which a gap has emerged –and is rapidly 
widening– between what children find easy to learn and are motivated to learn 
based on human evolutionary history, and what they need to learn to be 
successful adults in these societies. Unfortunately, the distinction between 
evolved biases in children’s learning and motivation to learn and their ability and 
motivation to learn cultural knowledge that has accumulated during the past 
several millennia has not been made in educational research or practice. In fact, 
the application of insights from evolutionary theory has not frequently occurred 
at all in the field of education, despite increasing acceptance among psycholo-
gical scientists (e.g., Buss, 2005). In this article, I provide a brief introduction 
to the interface between evolved aspects of children’s development and their 
schooling in modern societies (see also Geary, 2007, in press). In the first two 
sections, I outline the evolved cognitive, developmental, and motivational 
foundations for learning in evolutionarily-novel contexts, and in the third I 
discuss implications for children’s motivation and learning in modern schools.  
 
 
Evolution of the human mind 
 
 The mechanisms that drove the evolution of the human mind and brain 
and the corresponding ability to learn throughout the lifespan are vigorously 
debated. The proposals range from the ability to anticipate and adjust to cli-
matic fluctuations (Ash & Gallup, 2007; Kanazawa, 2004) to learning com-
plex hunting skills (Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000) to the demands 
of living in large, dynamic social groups (Alexander, 1989; Dunbar, 1998; 
Flinn, Geary, Ward, 2005; Geary, 2005; Humphrey, 1976). At the core of all 
of these proposals is the ability to anticipate changing conditions (e.g., climate 
or social relationships) and then to generate and mentally rehearse potential 
behavioral responses to these changes. The mechanisms that resulted in our 
ability to anticipate and cope with change are also the mechanisms that now 
allow us to create culture and to accumulate a wealth of evolutionarily-novel 
knowledge (Geary, 2005). The corresponding cognitive systems support chil-
dren’s ability to learn evolutionarily-novel information (e.g., sum of the inte-
rior angles of a triangle is 180) and skills (e.g., reading) in school, and the 
evolved motivational components influence their motivation, or lack thereof, 
to engage in school learning.  
 
Learning in school 
 
 All theories on how the human mind evolved focus on our ability to cope 
with conditions that were not entirely predictable from one situation to the 
next and had the potential to influence survival or reproductive prospects during 
 Children’s academic development: Where evolution meets culture 211 
 
Anuario de Psicología, vol. 39, nº 2, septiembre 2008, pp. 209-223 
© 2008, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat de Psicologia 
our evolutionary history. As an example, there are features of social life –ma-
rriage, investment in children, competition with other groups– that are found 
in all human cultures and presumably during human evolution (Brown, 1991), 
but the specifics differ from one group to the next, from one person to the next 
and across time. This is true in other primates as well, but their social behavior 
is much more stereotypical than that found in humans. In Hamadryas baboons 
(Papio hamadryas), for instance, the behavior of subordinate individuals to 
dominant individuals follows the same script, more or less, across dyads (see 
Parker, 2004). The social behavior of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and 
other great apes, is scripted to some extent but it is also more varied and flexi-
ble, requiring some degree of anticipation and planning. The latter requires a 
social apprenticeship whereby the scripts for some of the more complex fea-
tures of social life are elaborated upon during development, with the aid of 
older group members. This pattern is taken to the extreme in humans, making 
scripted “hardwired” responses to social relationships maladaptive; people 
who always respond in the same way are easily out maneuvered socially and 
thus at a disadvantage. 
 I proposed in my 2005 book, Origin of Mind: Evolution of Brain, Cogni-
tion, and General Intelligence, that the mechanisms that allow people to cope 
with novelty and change include general fluid intelligence and the underlying 
ability to focus attention and inhibit irrelevant information from entering into 
working memory. These mechanisms use information generated from folk-
modular systems (see below). The simultaneous representation of different 
pieces of information in working memory appears to be linked to the associ-
ated brain systems. In this way, evolved modular systems can be linked in 
novel ways (Sporns, Tononi, & Edelman, 2000), creating evolutionarily-novel 
abilities. For example, the linking of language systems to visual object-naming 
systems may contribute to our ability to read (Geary, 2007). Many modular 
systems are also internally modifiable in response to experience, especially 
early experience (Geary & Huffman, 2002); this means the systems can re-
spond to a range of information, within constraints (Sperber, 1994).  
 
Motivation to learn in school 
 
 The source or sources of the unpredictability that resulted in our ability to 
anticipate and adapt to novelty and change are predicted to have also resulted 
in motivational biases for the associated content. If anticipating and adapting 
to climatic change was a key evolutionary pressure, then humans are predicted 
to be biased to attend to corresponding information (e.g., cloud patterns) and 
engage in activities during development that facilitates the ability to predict 
climate change. In other words, if climatic variation was a selective pressure 
that drove the evolution of the human mind and brain, then children should be 
biased to learn about weather patterns. This knowledge cannot be “hardwired” 
because weather is too variable and thus a motivational bias to learn how to 
predict this variation should be part of children’s natural development. If 
learning the nuances of social dynamics was the driving force in human cogni-
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tive evolution, then learning and motivational biases organized around com-
mon social relationships, such as parents and peers, should be found. In either 
case, the predicted motivational biases are for content that differs from much 
of that taught in modern schools.  
 
Modular domains of mind 
 
 Whether the pressure were climatic, ecological, or social, the human mind 
and brain evolved to attend to, process, and guide behavioral responses to core 
types information: information that correlated with survival and reproductive 
prospects during our evolutionary history. Figure 1 shows a taxonomy of these 
biologically primary or core domains of human cognition (Geary, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolutionarily salient information-processing domains, and associated cognitive 
modules that compose the domains of folk psychology, folk biology, and folk physics.  
 
 The domains coalesce around folk psychology, folk biology, and folk 
physics (Atran, 1998; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Geary, 1995; Leslie, Freidman, & 
German, 2004; Mithen, 1996; Wellman & Gelman, 1992); there is also evi-
dence for an evolved set of quantitative abilities (Geary, 1995, R. Gelman, 
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1990; Spelke, 2000). I have suggested these folk systems are composed of a 
constellation of “soft” modular mechanisms. They are modular because they 
process specific forms of information and they are soft because they are sensi-
tive to and change in response to variation in the corresponding information 
patterns. A bias to orient to the human face and to automatically process key 
pieces of facial information (e.g., eyes) is an example of a modular primary 
ability (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). If the ability to discriminate 
one person from the next affords a social advantage over those who cannot 
make these discriminations, then evolution should produce a soft module, one 
with some degree of plasticity, but within constraints. Plasticity results in a 
capacity for the face-processing system to respond to experience with different 
people such that the system codes and stores information that allows people to 
discriminate one person from the next. 
 I have argued that the function of these folk competencies is to focus be-
havior on attempts to achieve access to and control of the social, biological, 
and physical resources that tended to enhance survival or reproductive prospects 
during human evolution (Geary, 2005). Achieving control is not guaranteed, 
and if it occurs it is typically without conscious awareness of the corresponding 
evolved function. Peer relationships are supported by folk-psychological com-
petencies, and much of the corresponding social behavior is not explicitly 
guided by a motivation to control the behavior of friends. Children’s peer rela-
tionships allow them to learn the nuances of social dynamics and to come to 
understand how they can influence other children and how others in the social 
group try to influence them. In traditional societies and during much of human 
evolution, these peers will become the adults with whom they will cooperate 
and compete for mates and other key resources. Early peer relationships be-
come the social-reproductive milieu of adulthood, and thus early learning can 
have evolutionary outcomes. In other words, whether people are aware of the 
evolved function, friendships are social resources that can enhance survival 
and reproductive prospects under the types of conditions found in traditional 
societies and presumably throughout human evolution.  
 
Folk systems  
 
 Folk psychology. The folk-psychological systems at the top of Figure 1 
represent three sets of modules that process information related to the self, 
other individuals, and group dynamics, respectively. The first includes aware-
ness of the self as a social being and awareness of one’s relationships with 
other people (e.g., Harter, 2006). Self awareness is tied to the ability to men-
tally project the self backward in time to recall episodes that are of personal 
importance and to project oneself forward in time; to create a self-centered 
mental simulation of potential future states (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; 
Tulving, 2002). Individual level modules process the information need for 
one-on-one social dynamics and to maintain social relationships (Bugental, 
2000). Group-level modules enable individuals to parse their social world into 
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categories of kin, members of favored in-groups, and members of disfavored 
out-groups.  
 People also have the unique ability to form in-groups on the basis of ideology, 
such as nation (Alexander, 1989). These ideologies include moral edicts re-
garding the treatment of in-group members, and mechanisms for their en-
forcement (Haidt, 2007). These ideologies support the formation of large-scale 
cooperative communities, provide stability across generations, and support the 
cross-generational accumulation of cultural knowledge. These biases evolved 
because they allow the formation of large competitive groups that are better 
able to control ecologies and social politics than are poorly organized groups. 
These ideologies are the foundation for the emergence of modern societies. The 
formation of these societies supports the division of labor needed for the creation 
of vast amounts of evolutionarily-novel information and supports the develop-
ment of schools. Most adults are freed from foraging and hunting demands 
and some specialize in generating new knowledge (e.g., scientists, poets). The 
formation of institutions that specialize in the creation of new knowledge, 
such as universities, has resulted in the exponential increase in evolutionarily-
novel knowledge over the past several thousand years, and especially during 
the 20th century. This trend is only going to increase and will result in an even 
greater importance for children’s schooling in the 21st century.  
 
 Folk biology and folk physics. Folk biological modules orient people to 
the biological world and result in the ability to develop taxonomies of other 
species and knowledge systems about their behavior, growth, and “essence” 
(Atran, 1998; New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). In traditional societies, these 
competencies support behavioral activities that allow people to use ecological 
resources for survival or reproductive purposes, such as hunting and horticul-
ture (Kaplan et al., 2000). Folk physical systems support navigation, the for-
mation of mental representations of physical features of the ecology, and the 
construction of tools (Pinker, 1997; Shepard, 1994). 
 
Folk heuristics 
 
 The behavioral features of folk domains can be described as “rules of 
thumb” (Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999). The corresponding 
information is processed implicitly and the behavioral component is more or 
less automatically executed (Simon, 1956). Returning to face processing, the 
pattern generated by the shape of the eyes and nose provides information on 
the sex of the individual, whereas the pattern generated by the configuration of 
the mouth provides information about the individual’s emotional state 
(Schyns, Bonnar, & Gosselin, 2002). These patterns are automatically and 
implicitly processed by the receiver, who in turn expresses corresponding 
emotional and other social signals (e.g., smile). The receiver may also make 
implicit decisions regarding the interaction, but these do not need to be explicitly 
represented in working memory and made available to conscious awareness. 
These quick, rule-of-thumb decisions can be based on automatically generated 
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feelings and other social information. Negative feelings, such as fear elicited 
by an angry expression, may prompt withdrawal; and positive feelings, such 
as happiness generated by a smile, a continuance of the interaction (Damasio, 
2003).  
 Folk heuristics can also include explicit inferential and attributional 
biases. People often make attributions about the cause of their failures to 
achieve desired outcomes and often attribute such failures to bad luck or 
biases in other people. An evolved tendency to make attributions of this type 
has the benefit of maintaining effort and control-related behavioral strategies in 
the face of inevitable failures (Heckhausen & Schultz, 1995). Social attributional 
biases that favor members of the in-group and derogate members of out-
groups are also well known (Fiske, 2002) and facilitate intergroup competition 
(Horowitz, 2001). Similar attributional biases have been identified in the areas 
of folk biology and folk physics (Atran, 1998; Clement, 1982).  
 These biases provide good enough explanations for day-to-day living and 
self-serving explanations for social and other phenomena. An evolved 
usefulness for everyday living does not mean the explanations are accurate 
from a scientific perspective. In fact, descriptions of psychological, physical, 
and biological phenomena are often correct (Wellman & Gelman, 1992), but 
many of the explicit explanations and attributional biases regarding the causes 
of these phenomena are objectively and scientifically inaccurate.  
 
 
Evolution and cognitive development 
 
 From an evolutionary perspective, cognitive development is the experience-
driven adaptation of biologically primary modular competencies to the nuances 
of the local social, biological, and physical ecologies (Geary & Bjorklund, 
2000). As noted, modular systems are predicted to be open to experiential 
modification to the extent that sensitivity to variation within these domains 
has been of potential survival or reproductive significance during human evo-
lution. At a macro level, prenatal brain organization provides the skeletal 
structure that comprises neural and perceptual modules that guide attention to 
and the processing of stable forms of information (e.g., the general shape of 
the human face) in the folk domains shown in Figure 1 (see also R. Gelman, 
1990). In support of this proposal, studies of infants’ attentional biases and 
preschool children’s nascent and implicit knowledge are often focused on 
these three folk domains (S. Gelman, 2003; Keil, Levin, Richman, & Gutheil, 
1999; Mandler, 1992; Wellman & Gelman, 1992).  
 The result are biases in postnatal attentional, affective, and information-
processing capacities, and in self-initiated behavioral engagement of the 
environment (Bjorklund, 2007; Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002; Scarr, 1992). 
The latter generate evolutionarily-expectant experiences, that is, experiences 
that provide the social and ecological feedback needed to adjust modular 
architecture to variation in information patterns in these domains (Greenough, 
Black, & Wallace, 1987). These behavioral biases are expressed as common 
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juvenile activities, such as social play and exploration of the ecology. Experience-
expectant processes result in the modification of plastic features of the modular 
systems. The result is the ability to identify and respond to variation (e.g., to 
discriminate one individual from another) within folk domains, and the ability 
to create the forms of category shown in Figure 1, such as in-groups/out-
groups or flora/fauna. 
 
Folk domains 
 
 Folk psychology. Human infants’ biases to attend to human faces, mo-
vement patterns, and speech reflects the initial and inherent organizational and 
motivational structure of folk psychological modules (Freedman, 1974). These 
biases reflect the evolutionary significance of social relationships and re-
create the microconditions (e.g., parent-child interactions) associated with the 
evolution of the corresponding modules (Caporael, 1997). Attention to and 
processing of this information provides exposure to the within-category 
variation needed to adapt the architecture of these modules to variation in 
parental faces, behavior, and so forth (R. Gelman & Williams, 1998). One 
result is that infants are able to discriminate the voice of their parents from the 
voice of other potential parents with only minimal exposure. When human 
fetuses (~ 38 weeks gestation) are exposed in utero to human voices, their 
heart-rate patterns suggest they are sensitive to and learn the voice patterns of 
their mother, and discriminate her voice from that of other women (Kisilevsky, 
Hains, Lee, Xie, Huang, Ye et al., 2003).  
 
 Folk biology and folk physics. The complexity of hunting and foraging 
demands varies across ecologies and thus creates a situation that should select 
for plasticity in the folk biological and physical systems. Children’s implicit folk 
biological knowledge and inherent interest in living things reflect a motivation 
to engage in experiences that automatically create taxonomies of local flora and 
fauna and result in the accrual of an extensive knowledge base of these species. 
In traditional societies, these experiences include assisting with foraging and play 
hunting (Blurton Jones, Hawkes, & O’Connell, 1997; Bock, 2005). Anthropo-
logical research indicates that it often takes many years of engaging in these forms 
of play and early work to master the skills and knowledge needed for success-
ful hunting and foraging in many of these societies (Kaplan et al., 2000).  
 Learning about the physical world is a complex endeavor for humans and 
requires an extended developmental period, in comparison with the more rapid 
learning that occurs in species that occupy a more narrow range of physical 
ecologies (Gallistel, 2000). The importance of early experience in this domain is 
illustrated by development of the ability to mentally form map-like representa-
tions of the large-scale environment. The initial ability to form these represen-
tations emerges by three years of age (DeLoache, Kolstad, & Anderson, 
1991), improves gradually through adolescence, and often requires extensive 
exploration and exposure to the local environment to perfect (Matthews, 
1992). Matthews’ research shows that children automatically attend to geo-
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metric features of the environment and landmarks within this environment and 
at a later time can generate a cognitive representation of landmarks and their 
geometric relations. Children’s skill at generating these representations increases 
with repeated explorations of the physical environment. Chen and Siegler’s 
(2000) finding that 18-month-olds have an implicit understanding of how to 
use simple tools and with experience learn to use these tools in increasingly 
effective ways suggests that similar processes occur for tool use (see also 
Gredlein & Bjorklund, 2005).  
 
 
Academic development  
 
 There is a cost to our extraordinary ability to create evolutionarily novel – bio-
logically secondary– knowledge and competencies: During the last several 
thousand years the cross-generational accumulation of cultural knowledge 
(e.g., through books) has occurred at such a rapid pace (Richerson & Boyd, 
2005), that the attentional and cognitive biases that facilitate the modification 
of folk abilities during children’s natural activities do not have evolved coun-
terparts to facilitate the learning of secondary abilities. A thorough discussion 
of the implications are elaborated elsewhere (Geary, 2007), but I highlight key 
aspects in the following sections.  
 
Motivation to learn 
 
 Theoretical and empirical research on children’s early attentional biases 
and activity preferences can be placed within an evolutionary perspective. 
And a broader understanding of these preferences and how they are expressed 
in school settings has the potential to significantly improve our understanding 
of children’s motivation (or not) to learn biologically secondary material.  
 A core prediction is that children’s evolved motivational biases will be 
focused on learning in folk domains and that they will prefer to engage in this 
learning through play and exploration. Children are also predicted to show a 
preference for the activities that promote the cross-generational transfer of know-
ledge in traditional societies. These activities involve stories to convey morals 
(i.e., cultural rules for social behavior) and other themes relevant to day-to-day 
living, and apprenticeships whereby culturally important skills (e.g., hunting, 
tool making) are learned through observation of or direct instruction by more 
skilled individuals (Brown, 1991). The specific content of these activities is 
centered on features of social living or the ecology that children will need to 
learn before assuming adult responsibilities. In other words, there are univer-
sal mechanisms that support the learning of culture-specific information (e.g., 
observational learning; Bandura, 1986), in addition to the attentional, motiva-
tional, and cognitive mechanisms described in Evolution and Cognitive De-
velopment. The combination results in human universals, such as face processing 
and language, as well as many cultural particulars that are variations on these 
themes.  
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 From this perspective, it is not surprising many school children value 
achievement in sports –ritualized practice of organized in-group/out-group 
competition (Geary, Byrd-Craven, Hoard, Vigil, & Numtee, 2003)– more than 
achievement in core academic areas (Eccles, Wigfield, Harold, & Blumenfeld, 
1993). It is also not surprising that many students report in-school activities to 
be a significant source of negative affect (Larson & Asmussen, 1991). Csik-
szentmihalyi and Hunter (2003) found that the lowest levels of happiness were 
experienced by children and adolescents while they were doing homework, 
listening to lectures, and doing mathematics, and the highest levels were ex-
perienced when they were talking with friends. For high-school students, the 
weekend is the highlight of their week, because they can socialize with their 
peers (Larson & Richards, 1998).  
 A preference for engagement in peer relationships might not be useful for 
mastery of many biologically secondary competencies taught in school, but it 
supports the prediction of an evolved bias for children to self-organize social 
activities during development; it is necessary to learn about one’s specific peer 
group and how to manage and influence dynamics in this group. Schooling is 
not, however, at odds with all evolved learning and motivational biases. This 
is because a long developmental period is predicted to have co-evolved with 
an interest in and an ability to transfer culturally important information across 
generations (Bjorklund, 2007; Flinn, 1997; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). A species-
typical curiosity about and an ability to learn evolutionarily-novel information 
is predicted, but so are substantive individual differences in the motivation and 
ability to learn this information. The gist is if there were not a gap between the 
secondary knowledge needed to function well in modern societies and evolved 
motivational and learning biases, then the motivational dispositions, interests, 
and abilities of the creative-productive individuals who developed this secon-
dary knowledge (e.g., Murray, 2003) would be mundane and easily acquired 
without schooling. This is not the case. 
 If our goal is universal education that encompasses a variety of evolutionarily 
novel academic domains (e.g., mathematics) and abilities (e.g., phonetic de-
coding as related to reading), then we cannot assume that an inherent curiosity 
or motivation to learn will be sufficient for most children and adolescents. 
Children’s and adolescent’s explicit valuation of academic learning, the per-
ceived utility of academic skills, and the centrality of these areas to their over-
all self esteem is predicted to be highly dependent on social-cultural valuation 
of academic competencies, such as explicit rewards for academic achievement 
(e.g., honor rolls) and valuation of cultural innovators (e.g., Edison). In con-
trast, the child’s and adolescent’s valuation and perceived efficacy of their 
physical traits or social relationships are implicit features of their evolved folk 
psychology and will manifest with or without cultural supports.  
 
Learning in school 
 
 Biologically secondary learning is the acquisition of culturally important 
information and skills using the mechanisms that evolved to enable people to 
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cope with novelty and change within lifetimes and that enable the cross-generatio-
nal transfer of cultural knowledge. I provide the details of the mechanisms I sug-
gest support secondary learning elsewhere (Geary, 2005, 2007). In the following 
sections, I use the relation between folk psychological modules and reading to 
illustrate how secondary abilities appear to be constructed from primary systems.  
 
Folk psychology and learning to read 
 
 Writing is the primary means through which secondary knowledge has 
accumulated over the past several millennia and reading this material is the 
primary means for transmitting this knowledge across generations. From an 
evolutionary perspective, writing initially emerged from the motivation of 
people to communicate with and influence other people, and the desire to read 
from the benefits of learning from others. It has been proposed that reading is 
built upon evolved language systems (e.g., Mann, 1984; Rozin, 1976). I elaborate 
on this proposal by linking the learning of how to read and reading comprehen-
sion to several folk psychological domains. 
 Research on children’s reading acquisition supports the prediction that 
many components of reading competency are dependent on language systems 
(Bradley & Bryant, 1983; Hindson, Byrne, Shankweiler, Fielding-Barnsley, 
Newman, & Hine, 2005; Wagner & Torgesen, 1987). Core early components 
include phonemic awareness –explicit awareness of distinct language sounds– 
and the ability to decode unfamiliar written words into basic sounds. Decoding 
requires an explicit representation of the sound (e.g., ba, da, ka) in phonemic 
working memory and the association of this sound and blends of sounds with 
corresponding visual patterns (Bradley & Bryant, 1983). The ease of learning 
basic word-decoding skills in first grade is predicted by the fidelity of children's 
phonological processing systems (e.g., skill at discriminating language sounds) 
in kindergarten (Wagner, Torgesen, & Rashotte, 1994). Children who show a 
strong explicit awareness of basic language sounds easily learn to associate 
these sounds with the symbol system of the written language. In contrast with 
natural language learning, the majority of children acquire these competencies 
most effectively with systematic, organized, and teacher-directed explicit instruc-
tion on phoneme identification, blending, and word decoding (e.g., Hindson et 
al., 2005). Skilled reading also requires text comprehension which is dependent 
on several component skills, such as locating main themes and distinguishing 
relevant from less relevant passages. As with more basic reading skills, many 
children require explicit instruction in the use of these strategies to aid in text 
comprehension (Connor, Morrison, & Petrella, 2004). 
 From an evolutionary perspective, text comprehension will be dependent in 
part on theory of mind and other folk psychological domains, at least for genre 
that involve human relationships (Geary, 1998). Most of these stories involve 
the re-creation of social relationships, more complex patterns of social dynamics, 
and even elaborate person schema knowledge for main characters. The theme 
of many of the most popular genre involves the dynamics of mating relation-
ships and competition for mates. One implication is that once people learn to 
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read, they engage in this secondary activity because it allows for the represen-
tation of evolutionarily salient themes, particularly the mental representation 
and rehearsal of social dynamics. In addition, some people are predicted to be 
interested in reading about mechanical things and biological phenomena, re-
flecting interests associated with folk –physical and– biological systems.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 People have evolved to create cultural ideologies and rules for social be-
havior. These provide the structure for the formation and stability of large 
cooperative groups (Baumeister, 2005; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Children and 
adults have evolved corresponding learning and motivational mechanisms that 
support the cross-generational transfer of knowledge that is useful in their culture. 
In traditional societies, the mechanisms that support the cross-generational 
transfer of knowledge include child-initiated play, observational learning, and 
adults’ use of stories and apprenticeships to teach cultural knowledge. These 
mechanisms may no longer be sufficient for preparing children for adulthood 
in modern societies, because of the vast amount of cultural knowledge that has 
accumulated during the past several thousand years and the array and complexity 
of secondary abilities (e.g., reading, algebra) needed to function in these societies. 
Schools emerged in modern societies to address the limitations of these mecha-
nisms and to formalize the cross-generational transfer of knowledge. In other 
words, schools are the central interface between evolution and culture –they 
are the venues in which children’s evolved biases in learning and motivation 
intersect with the need to learn the secondary abilities and knowledge needed 
to be successful in modern societies.  
 This perspective has the potential to answer many questions in instruction 
and learning that are not otherwise fully understandable. Why do most chil-
dren need explicit instruction to learn word decoding and text comprehension 
but do not need instruction to produce and understand natural language? Why 
do most children value peer relationships more than they value academic 
learning? Among many implications, effective instruction in secondary aca-
demic domains will be dependant on the same attentional control and working 
memory systems that evolved to cope with variation and novelty within life-
times (see Geary, 2005, 2007), and leads to the hypothesis that many children 
will need to have any associated problem-solving steps explicitly organized by 
instructional materials and extensively practiced for long-term retention (e.g., 
Sweller, 2004). Unlike the adaptation of primary systems (e.g., language, folk 
biology) to the nuances of the local social group and ecology, learning in these 
domains is not privileged by inherent attentional, cognitive, and motivational 
systems. Because of this, teachers must provide the structure and organization 
to secondary learning that has been provided to primary learning by our evolu-
tionary history. With respect to motivation, children’s natural curiosity and 
desire to learn cannot be assumed to be sufficient to support the long and ef-
fortful learning needed to master secondary domains, such as algebra. 
 Children’s academic development: Where evolution meets culture 221 
 
Anuario de Psicología, vol. 39, nº 2, septiembre 2008, pp. 209-223 
© 2008, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat de Psicologia 
REFERENCES 
 
Alexander, R.D. (1989). Evolution of the human psyche. In P. Mellars & C. Stringer (Eds.), The human revolu-
tion: Behavioural and biological perspectives on the origins of modern humans (pp. 455-513). Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Ash, J., & Gallup, G.G.Jr. (2007). Paleoclimatic variation and brain expansion during human evolution. Human 
Nature, 18, 109-124.  
Atran, S. (1998). Folk biology and the anthropology of science: Cognitive universals and cultural particulars. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 547-609. 
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford 
Books. 
Baumeister, R.F. (2005). The cultural animal: Human nature, meaning, and social life. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.  
Bjorklund, D.F. (2007). Why youth is not wasted on the young: Immaturity in human development. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Bjorklund, D. F., & Pellegrini, A. D. (2002). The origins of human nature: Evolutionary developmental psychology. 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Blurton Jones, N. G., Hawkes, K., & O’Connell, J. F. (1997). Why do Hadza children forage? In N.L. Segal, 
G.E. Weisfeld, & C.C. Weisfeld (Eds.), Uniting psychology and biology. Integrative perspectives on 
human development (pp. 279-313). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Bock, J. (2005). What makes a competent adult forager? In B. S. Hewlett & M. E. Lamb (Eds.), Hunter-gatherer 
childhoods: Evolutionary, developmental & cultural perspectives (109-128). New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers. 
Bradley, L., & Bryant, P.E. (1983, February 3). Categorizing sounds and learning to read – A causal connection. 
Nature, 301, 419-421. 
Brown, D.E. (1991). Human universals. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Bugental, D.B. (2000). Acquisition of the algorithms of social life: A domain-based approach. Psychological 
Bulletin, 126, 187-219. 
Buss, D.M. (Ed.) (2005). The evolutionary psychology handbook. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons. 
Caporael, L.R. (1997). The evolution of truly social cognition: The core configurations model. Personality & 
Social Psychology Review, 1, 276-298. 
Chen, Z., & Siegler, R.S. (2000). Across the great divide: Bridging the gap between understanding toddlers’ and 
older children’s thinking. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 65 (No 2, se-
rial no. 261). 
Clement, J. (1982). Students' preconceptions in introductory mechanics. American Journal of Physics, 50, 66-71. 
Connor, C.M., Morrison, F.J., & Petrella, J.N. (2004). Effective reading comprehension instruction: Examining 
child x instruction interactions. Journal of Educational Psychology, 96, 682-698. 
Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Hunter, J. (2003). Happiness in everyday life: The uses of experience sampling. Jour-
nal of Happiness Studies, 4, 185-199. 
Damasio, A. (2003). Looking for Spinoza: Joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain. Orlando, FL: Harcourt, Inc. 
DeLoache, J.S., Kolstad, D.V., & Anderson, K.N. (1991). Physical similarity and young children’s understanding of 
scale models. Child Development, 62, 111-126. 
Dunbar, R.I.M. (1998). The social brain hypothesis. Evolutionary Anthropology, 6, 178-190. 
Eccles, J., Wigfield, A., Harold, R.D., & Blumenfeld, P. (1993). Age and gender differences in children's self- 
and task perceptions during elementary school. Child Development, 64, 830-847. 
Fiske, S.T. (2002). What we know now about bias and intergroup conflict, the problem of the century. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 123-128. 
Flinn, M.V. (1997). Culture and the evolution of social learning. Evolution and Human Behavior, 18, 23-67. 
Flinn, M.V., Geary, D.C., & Ward, C.V. (2005). Ecological dominance, social competition, and coalitionary arms 
races: Why humans evolved extraordinary intelligence. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 10-46. 
Freedman, D.G. (1974). Human infancy: An evolutionary perspective. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Gallistel, C.R. (2000). The replacement of general-purpose learning models with adaptively specialized learning 
modules. In M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The new cognitive neurosciences (second edition) (pp. 1179-1191). 
Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press. 
Geary, D.C. (1995). Reflections of evolution and culture in children’s cognition: Implications for mathematical 
development and instruction. American Psychologist, 50, 24-37. 
Geary, D.C. (1998). Male, female: The evolution of human sex differences. Washington, DC: American Psycho-
logical Association. 
222 D.C. Geary 
 
Anuario de Psicología, vol. 39, nº 2, septiembre 2008, pp. 209-223 
© 2008, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat de Psicologia 
Geary, D.C. (2005). The origin of mind: Evolution of brain, cognition, and general intelligence. Washington, 
DC: American Psychological Association. 
Geary, D.C. (2007). Educating the evolved mind: Conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psy-
chology. In J.S. Carlson & J.R. Levin (Eds.), Educating the evolved mind (pp. 1-99, Vol. 2, Psychologi-
cal perspectives on contemporary educational issues). Greenwich, CT: Information Age. 
Geary, D.C. (in press). An evolutionarily informed education science. Educational Psychologist. 
Geary, D.C., & Bjorklund, D.F. (2000). Evolutionary developmental psychology. Child Development, 71, 57-65. 
Geary, D.C., Byrd-Craven, J., Hoard, M. K., Vigil, J., & Numtee, C. (2003). Evolution and development of 
boys’ social behavior. Developmental Review, 23, 444-470. 
Geary, D.C., & Huffman, K.J. (2002). Brain and cognitive evolution: Forms of modularity and functions of 
mind. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 667-698. 
Gelman, R. (1990). First principles organize attention to and learning about relevant data: Number and animate-
inanimate distinction as examples. Cognitive Science, 14, 79-106. 
Gelman, R., & Williams, E.M. (1998). Enabling constraints for cognitive development and learning: Domain-
specificity and epigenesis. In D. Kuhl & R.S. Siegler (Vol. Eds.), Cognition, perception, and language, 
Vol 2 (pp. 575-630). W. Damon (Gen. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology (Fifth Ed.). New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Gelman, S.A. (2003). The essential child: Origins of essentialism in everyday thought. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P.M., & ABC Research Group (Eds.) (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Gredlein, J.M., & Bjorklund, D.F. (2005). Sex differences in young children’s use of tools in a problem-solving 
task. Human Nature, 16, 211-232. 
Greenough, W.T., Black, J.E., & Wallace, C.S. (1987). Experience and brain development. Child Development, 
58, 539-559. 
Haidt, J. (2007, May 18). The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science, 316, 998-1002. 
Harter, S. (2006). The self. In N. Eisenberg (Vol. Ed.), Social, emotional, and personality development, Vol 3 
(pp. 505-570). W. Damon & R. M. Lerner (Gen. Eds.), Handbook of child psychology (6th Ed.). New 
York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Heckhausen, J., & Schulz, R. (1995). A life-span theory of control. Psychological Review, 102, 284-304. 
Hindson, B., Byrne, B., Shankweiler, D., Fielding-Barnsley, R., Newman, C., & Hine, D.W. (2005). Assessment 
and early instruction of preschool children at risk for reading disability. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 97, 687-704. 
Horowitz, D. L. (2001). The deadly ethnic riot. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Humphrey, N.K. (1976). The social function of intellect. In P.P.G. Bateson & R.A. Hinde (Eds.), Growing points 
in ethology (pp. 303-317). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kanazawa, S. (2004). General intelligence as a domain-specific adaptation. Psychological Review, 111, 512-523. 
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M.M. (1997). The fusiform face area: A module in human extrastriate 
cortex specialized for face perception. Journal of Neuroscience, 17, 4302-4311. 
Kaplan, H., Hill, K., Lancaster, J., & Hurtado, A.M. (2000). A theory of human life history evolution: Diet, 
intelligence, and longevity. Evolutionary Anthropology, 9, 156-185. 
Keil, F.C., Levin, D.T., Richman, B.A., & Gutheil, G. (1999). Mechanism and explanation in the development of 
biological thought: The case of disease. In D.L. Medin & S. Atran (Eds.), Folkbiology (pp. 285-319). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Book. 
Kisilevsky, B.S., Hains, S.M.J., Lee, K., Xie, X., Huang, H., Ye, H.H. et al. (2003). Effects of experience on 
fetal voice recognition. Psychological Science, 14, 220-224. 
Larson, R., & Asmussen, L. (1991). Anger, worry, and hurt in early adolescence: An enlarging world of negative 
emotions. In M.E. Colten & S. Gore (Eds.), Adolescent stress: Causes and consequences (pp. 21-41). 
New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Larson, R., & Richards, M. (1998). Waiting for the weekend: Friday and Saturday night as the emotional climax 
of the week. New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 82, 37-51. 
Leslie, A.M., Friedman, O., & German, T. P. (2004). Core mechanisms in ‘theory of mind’. Trends in Cognitive 
Science, 8, 528-533. 
Mandler, J.M. (1992). How to build a baby: II. Conceptual primitives. Psychological Review, 99, 587-604. 
Mann, V.A. (1984). Reading skill and language skill. Developmental Review, 4, 1-15. 
Matthews, M.H. (1992). Making sense of place: Children’s understanding of large-scale environments. Savage, 
MD: Barnes & Noble Books. 
Mithen, S. (1996). The prehistory of the mind: The cognitive origins of art and science. New York: Thames and 
Hudson, Inc. 
 Children’s academic development: Where evolution meets culture 223 
 
Anuario de Psicología, vol. 39, nº 2, septiembre 2008, pp. 209-223 
© 2008, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat de Psicologia 
Murray, C. (2003). Human accomplishment: The pursuit of excellence in the arts and sciences, 800 B.C. to 1950. 
New York: HarperCollins. 
New, J., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2007). Category-specific attention for animals reflects ancestral priorities, 
not expertise. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 104, 16598-16603. 
Parker, S.T. (2004). The cognitive complexity of social organization and socialization in wild baboons and 
chimpanzees: Guided participation, socializing interactions, and event representation. In A.E. Russon 
and D.R. Begun (Eds.), The evolution of thought: Evolutionary origins of great ape intelligence (pp. 45-
60). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 
Richerson, P.J., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Rozin, P. (1976). The evolution of intelligence and access to the cognitive unconscious. In J.M. Sprague & A.N. 
Epstein (Eds.), Progress in psychobiology and physiological psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 245-280). New 
York: Academic Press. 
Scarr, S. (1992). Developmental theories of the 1990s: Developmental and individual differences. Child Develop-
ment, 63, 1-19. 
Schyns, P.G., Bonnar, L., & Gosselin, F. (2002). Show me the features! Understanding recognition from the use 
of visual information. Psychological Science, 13, 402-409. 
Shepard, R.N. (1994). Perceptual-cognitive universals as reflections of the world. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 1, 2-28. 
Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological Review, 63, 129-138. 
Spelke, E. S. (2000). Core knowledge. American Psychologist, 55, 1233-1243. 
Sperber, D. (1994). The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations. In L.A. Hirschfeld & 
S.A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 39-67). New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sporns, O., Tononi, G., & Edelman, G.M. (2000). Connectivity and complexity: The relationship between neuro-
anatomy and brain dynamics. Neural Networks, 13, 909-922. 
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M.C. (1997). Mental time travel and the evolution of the human mind. Genetic, 
Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 123, 133-167. 
Sweller, J. (2004). Instructional design consequences of an analogy between evolution by natural selection and 
human cognitive architecture. Instructional Science, 32, 9-31. 
Wagner, R.K., & Torgesen, J.K. (1987). The nature of phonological processing and its causal role in the acquisi-
tion of reading skills. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 192-212. 
Wagner, R.K., Torgesen, J.K., & Rashotte, C.A. (1994). Development of reading-related phonological processing 
abilities: New evidence of bidirectional causality from a latent variable longitudinal study. Developmental 
Psychology, 30, 73-87. 
Wellman, H.M., & Gelman, S.A. (1992). Cognitive development: Foundational theories of core domains. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 43, 337-375. 
